Abstract: This study examines empirically how the presence of accrual management may affect firm valuation. We compare the performance of earnings-based and non-earnings-based valuation models, represented by Residual Income Model (RIM) and Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), respectively, based on the absolute percentage pricing and valuation errors for two subsets of US firms: "Suspect" firms that are likely to have engaged in accrual management and "Normal" firms matched on industry, year and size. Results indicate that RIM enjoys an accuracy advantage over DCF when accrual management is not a serious concern. However, the presence of accrual management significantly narrows RIM's accuracy advantage over DCF from the level observed for the matched Normal firms. These results are robust to the choice of model benchmark (i.e., current stock price vs. ex post intrinsic value), alternative definitions of Suspect (i.e., loss or earnings-decline avoidance vs. earnings-decline avoidance only vs. loss avoidance only) and of Normal firms (i.e., excluding vs. including real activity manipulators), and different assumptions about post-horizon growth (i.e., 2% vs. 4%). The overall conclusion that accrual management impairs RIM's performance extends to settings where the regression model is expanded to include accrual components and when we focus on large, rather than small, earnings manipulators. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of considering earnings quality when assessing the performance of earnings-based valuation models. 
1.
Introduction Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson (1995, 1996) provide a conceptual framework for relating accounting earnings to firm value. Since then, several empirical studies have shown that earningsbased valuation models can give better estimates of firm value than non-earnings-based valuation models. While accounting earnings have regained popularity among researchers, financial analysts and investors in recent years, evidence suggests that earnings are often subject to managerial manipulations. Such manipulations, driven by the pressure to meet or beat earnings expectations, are believed to have eroded the quality of earnings and led to highly publicized corporate scandals.
The perceived erosion of financial reporting quality in turn prompted the US Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on July 30, 2002 with the stated objective of restoring investor confidence in financial and public reporting.
The purpose of this study is to examine empirically how the presence of accrual management may affect firm valuation. We integrate two major streams of academic research: First, the valuation literature that compares the relative performance of earnings-based and non-earningsbased valuation models (e.g., RIM and DCF), after taking into consideration the potential effect accrual management may have on model inputs. Our aim is to shed light on whether the previously documented superiority of earnings-based valuation models continues to hold when earnings are managed (Beaver, 2002) . Second, we extend the traditional earnings management literature that examines the incentives for, and the existence of, earnings management, as well as the more recent literature studying its market consequences. Our contributions lie in documenting the impact of earnings management on the usefulness of earnings vs. cash flows using analysts' forecasts of earnings and cash flows as proxies for current market expectations about future firm performance for valuation purposes.
Using a matched-pair design, we compare the absolute percentage estimation errors for the RIM and DCF valuation models calculated by reference to two benchmarks, current stock price and ex post intrinsic value. Our sample is drawn from an eleven-year (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) period that pre-dates major corporate scandals and the ensuing legislative events, allowing us to better isolate the effect of accrual management on the relative performance of these two models. In our main analysis, the final sample consists of 776 (768) firm-year observations with complete annual financial and stock price information and forecast data based on the pricing-error (valuation-error) analysis. Half of the sample is suspected to have engaged in accrual management and the other half, matched on industry, year and size, is considered to be normal. Univariate results indicate that in the absence of accrual management RIM enjoys an accuracy advantage over DCF, measured by the difference in mean absolute percentage estimation errors. This difference is larger than that documented for the full sample in the prior valuation literature. Results from both univariate and regression analysis also show that accrual management adversely affects the performance of the RIM model to significantly narrow its accuracy advantage over DCF from the level observed for the matched Normal firms. Under RIM, for the average share price of $36.46 in our sample, accrual management yields on average a $1.97 (5.4%) higher forecasted price than if firms do not manage earnings, an effect which is economically and statistically significant. The corresponding per share difference in forecasted price under DCF is considerably lower at $0.40, and it is not statistically significant.
Our results are robust to the choice of model benchmark (e.g., current stock price vs. ex post intrinsic value), alternative definitions of Suspect (i.e., loss or earnings-decline avoidance vs.
earnings-decline avoidance only vs. loss avoidance only) and of Normal firms (i.e., excluding vs.
including real activity manipulators), and different assumptions about post-horizon growth (i.e., 2%
vs. 4%). Further analysis indicates that the overall conclusion that accrual management impairs RIM's performance extends to settings where the regression model is expanded to include components of accruals and when we focus on large, rather than small, earnings manipulators.
Taken together, these results highlight the importance of considering earnings quality when assessing the performance of earnings-based valuation models. By explicitly allowing for the manipulations of reported earnings, we arguably offer a more accurate assessment of the estimation ability of earnings-based valuation models relative to non-earnings-based models.
Our study is of practical relevance. Earnings are used extensively to evaluate firm performance and estimate firm value in practice. The majority of the 400 CFOs surveyed by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) believe that earnings, not cash flows, are the key metric used by outside stakeholders. Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that investors use earnings to evaluate firm performance. However, when earnings are managed, heavy reliance on this number in firm valuation may result in inaccurate assessment, undesirable investment decisions and misallocation of resources. Our research intends to quantify this effect and to raise awareness among investors and practitioners about the pitfalls of taking managed earnings at face value and using them directly in firm valuation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 discusses the research methodology, along with variable definitions and measurements; Section 4 summarizes our sample selection procedure; Section 5 presents the main empirical findings and robustness checks, followed by further analysis in Section 6; and Section 7 concludes the study.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Usefulness of Earnings in Firm Valuation
Earnings-based valuation models, such as the Residual Income Model (RIM), express firm value as a function of current book value and forecasted future earnings. Several empirical studies have shown that the intrinsic value metrics estimated using these models help identify potential stock mispricing and predict future returns (Dechow et al., 1999; Lee et al., 1999; Frankel and Lee, 1998) .
In particular, investors can earn positive abnormal returns by adopting a strategy of buying stocks which are undervalued relative to intrinsic value estimates and short selling overvalued stocks.
Parallel to this line of enquiry is research that looks into the relative performance of earnings-based and non-earnings-based valuation models. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) The aforementioned so-called "horse race" literature focuses on pricing errors and uses current stock price as the benchmark for model comparisons under the maintained assumption that the market is efficient and stock price is the best measure of firm value. More recently, Subramanyam and Venkatachalam (2007) argue that ex post realizations may provide a more appropriate benchmark for ex ante market expectations than current stock price, as the former is not subject to potential problems arising from temporary mispricing in the presence of earnings management. Notwithstanding differences in the choice of benchmarks however, the authors again conclude that earnings are more useful for firm valuation than cash flows.
Earnings Management
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) remark that "... earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers." Studies have shown that firms often manage their earnings in advance of IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; Dechow et al., 1996) and that firms involved in earnings manipulations or singled out by the SEC for accounting enforcement actions generally have weak internal governance (Farber, 2005; Bédard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996) . Dechow et al. (2003) point to meeting or beating earnings targets as one of the important incentives for earnings management. Consistent with this notion, Gore et al. (2007) find that the low frequency of small losses and the high frequency of small profits documented in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) disappear when they remove the current accruals management from the reported earnings of a sample of UK firms. Several factors have been cited as contributing to a firm's motivation to meet or beat earnings targets by managing reported earnings. First, the stock market tends to punish firms for falling short of earnings expectations (Skinner and Sloan, 2002) . In particular, firms maintaining a string of steadily increasing earnings are rewarded with market premiums and are severely punished as soon as the string is broken (Myers et al., 2006; Barth et al., 1999) . Second, meeting or beating earnings targets allows executives to enhance their reputation with stakeholders, enjoy better terms of trade and achieve higher bonus compensations (DeGeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Bowen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985) . Failing to meet earnings expectations could result in reputation loss and pay cuts for CEOs (Matsunaga and Park, 2001 ).
Countering these incentives are the capital market consequences that firms face when their alleged earnings manipulations become public (Dechow et al., 1996) . If the market can see through accrual manipulations, then its participants should be able to spot earnings management practices and undo manipulations to reflect pre-managed earnings for use in firm valuation. However, corporate disclosures often do not contain sufficient information for the investors to infer accounting accruals, limiting their ability to completely impound the effect of earnings management into stock prices (Gleason and Mills, 2008; Baber et al., 2006; Balsam et al., 2002) . Likewise, studies have found that financial analysts cannot fully correct for earnings management in their short-term (e.g., one-year ahead) earnings forecasts (Bradshaw et al., 2001; Dechow et al., 1999) , as
it is far more difficult to determine the effect of earnings management when forecasting future years' earnings due to the uneven reversal patterns of discretionary accruals, compared to estimating the discretionary accruals for the current year.
While both investors and financial analysts have at least some information about the firm to partially undo accrual manipulations, there is one important incentive difference that sets these two groups of market participants apart. Unlike the investors, most analysts are rewarded, financially or reputationally, for their ability to issue accurate short-term earnings forecasts (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Mikhail et al., 1997) . If this is the case, then we would expect analysts to be motivated to minimize forecast errors by forecasting post-managed, rather than the pre-managed, earnings.
Hypotheses
A number of high-profile corporate scandals involving financial reporting frauds taking place around the year 2000 have called into question the integrity of published accounting numbers.
Unlike the extant literature looking into the market consequences of earnings management, our interest is in contrasting the usefulness of earnings in firm valuation, relative to cash flows, when earnings are managed. In this case, earnings are likely to be biased and hence do not accurately reflect the firm's true performance. As a result, valuation models using analysts' forecasts of managed earnings as inputs may be less accurate in estimating a firm's true intrinsic value. By comparison, accrual management is likely to have a more limited effect on the estimation ability of the DCF model. Burgstahler and Eames (2010) find that analysts forecast "earnings after management" to achieve forecast accuracy (i.e., the difference between forecasted and actual earnings). To achieve accurate cash flow forecasts, they would start from the earnings forecast and try to undo accrual management to arrive at the correct cash flow forecasts. This conjecture is supported by our data (discussed in Section 4) which indicate that only 48% of the variability in VL cash flow forecasts are driven by common factors that also drive the earnings forecasts. Thus, the former is unlikely to be a naïve extension of the latter.
Taken together, we expect the accuracy advantage of RIM over DCF documented in previous research to be most pronounced for the subset of firms not suspected to have managed earnings (labelled Normal firms hereafter), but much less so for the subset of firms suspected to have managed accruals (labelled Suspect firms hereafter). Comparing the wedge between RIM and DCF across these two groups of firms, we expect accrual management to bring the wedge down from the level observed when the prospect of accrual management is not considered. The above discussion leads to the following two hypotheses (stated in the alternate form):
H1: The DCF valuation models generate larger estimation errors than the corresponding RIM valuation models for the Normal firms.
H2: The superiority of RIM over DCF valuation models is lower for the Suspect firms than for the Normal firms.
Research Methodology
Normal and Suspect Firms
In the main analysis, we focus on small earnings manipulations that allow firms to just avoid incurring loss or earnings decline in the current reporting period. 3 This approach generates a larger number of Suspect firms and hence offers a more powerful test than the case when each of these two earnings thresholds is analyzed separately. For the loss-avoidance threshold, we follow Givoly et al. (2010) and classify firms into the Suspect group when (1) their reported earnings before extraordinary items exceed zero by no more than 4% of the end-of-year market value of equity; 4 (2) they report positive discretionary accruals; 5 and (3) their level of discretionary accruals is greater than the amount of reported earnings, but does not exceed 4% of the market value of equity.
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The remaining firms are placed in the Normal group. 7 Suspect and Normal firms for the earningsdecline avoidance threshold can be defined analogously.
8
Later on, we demonstrate that our results remain qualitatively unchanged when these two earnings thresholds are introduced one at a time (Section 5.3) or when the Normal group of firms are redefined to exclude firms which are suspected to have managed their real activities (Section 5.4). We also consider the effect of individual accrual components in firm valuation (Section 6.1) and the implications of having Suspect firms alternatively defined as large earnings manipulators (Section 6.2).
Valuation Models
We use RIM (DCF) as the representative earnings-(non-earnings-) based valuation model. To test the predictions of Hypotheses H1 and H2, we estimate intrinsic values (IV) for each firm-year observation on the valuation date t as indicated below:
The valuation date t is defined as the date of the first VL forecast made after Year t's earnings announcement, but not more than 30 days after the first quarterly earnings announcement for Year t+1. The variable R is one plus the cost of equity capital. 
most of the analysis reported in the paper, the constant growth rate g is set at 2% to approximate the rate of inflation during our sample period (Penman and Sougiannis, 1998) . As robustness checks, we also consider the consequence of having a larger constant growth rate of 4% (see Section 5.5).
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Valuation Benchmarks
To assess the relative performances of RIM and DCF valuation models, we employ the following two benchmarks throughout the paper: (1) Current stock price, which assumes that any bias or measurement error due to violations of the efficient market hypothesis is a constant factor in comparisons across DCF and RIM models, (2) Ex post intrinsic value (IV) measure, calculated as the sum of actual dividends over a three-year horizon and market price at the horizon, discounted to the forecast date (Subramanyam and Venkatachalam, 2007) .
Since our interest is in the relative accuracy of RIM and DCF models, we focus on the 
Research Approaches
We use a matched-pair design under which each Suspect firm-year observation is matched with a Normal firm drawn from the same Fama and French (1993) by the same degree. To control for these potential sources of differences in estimation errors between RIM and DCF, we provide a further test of the prediction of H2 in a multivariate setting using the following regression model:
where the dependent variable DIFF is defined as the difference in absolute percentage estimation errors between RIM and DCF for each firm-year observation, i.e., (AE_DCF -AE_RIM).
"SUSPECT" is the test variable, set equal to one if the firm is suspected to have managed its earnings and zero otherwise. Equation 3 includes three control variables: book-to-market ratio (BM), defined as book value per share over stock price, measured at the end of Year t; earnings shock (ES), defined as the absolute value of the change in net income from Year t-1 to Year t, scaled by opening total assets; and standard deviation of return on equity (Std_ROE) over a 5-year period immediately preceding the end of Year t.
The slope coefficient a 1 in Equation 3 captures the effect of accrual management on RIM's accuracy advantage over DCF, after controlling for the cross-sectional variations in growth, earnings shocks and return volatility, and it is predicted to be negative under H2. We do not offer directional predictions for any of the control variables, as these factors may also affect analyst forecasts of future cash flows. Thus, it is not clear whether the reduction in valuation accuracy due to these factors is greater under RIM or under DCF.
Sample Selection
Our initial Table 1 ). Moreover, there is no obvious domination by any particular industry in either sample. As is evident in Column 1 (2), Panel C of Table 1 , the industry distribution for the pricing-error (valuation-error) sample ranges from a high of 9% (9.1%) in the Automobiles and Trucks (Machinery) industry to a low of 0% (0.3%) in the Printing & Publishing and Consumer Goods (Textiles) industries.
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Panels A and B of [Insert Table 2 about Here]
Main Results
Panel A of Table 3 presents the univariate one-tailed tests of Hypotheses H1 and H2 using a 2% constant growth rate to estimate terminal values. The corresponding multivariate one-tailed tests of Hypothesis H2 appear in Panel B. In each panel, we report two sets of results, where the first one is based on the pricing-error sample using current stock price as the model benchmark (Column 1) and the second one based on the valuation-error sample using ex post intrinsic value as the benchmark (Column 2). This presentation format is used in subsequent tables as well. Column 2) in the pricing-error and valuation-error samples, respectively. These regression results are consistent with our univariate findings that RIM's relative accuracy advantage is diminished for Suspect firms.
Of the three control variables, the coefficient estimates on BM, ES and Std_ROE are positive and significant at the 5% level in the pricing error-based DIFF regression. In the valuation errorbased regression, the results are somewhat weaker and only Std_ROE retains its significance, possibly due to the higher variability in the distribution of ex post IV identified in Table 2 . It would appear that RIM's advantage is more pronounced among firms experiencing high volatility in ROE (i.e., large values of Std_ROE), low growth (high BM ratios) and an earnings shock in the current period (ES).
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
Robustness Checks Based on Alternative Definitions of Suspect Firms
To maximize the sample size, we have assumed that firms were motivated to avoid either losses or earnings declines. We now check the sensitivity of our main results to alternative definitions of Suspect firms by reference to a single earnings threshold.
Starting with the avoidance of earnings-decline criterion, we identify 318 firm-year 18 Univariate results for the pricing-error sample are qualitatively similar, but multivariate results are weaker. In particular, the SUSPECT variable is insignificantly different from zero at the conventional levels.
Robustness Checks Based on Alternative Definitions of Normal Firms -Real Activity Earnings management
In the main analysis, we have viewed firms as normal if they do not meet the three criteria involving total discretionary accruals for Suspect firms discussed in Section 3. However, accrual management is not the only tool that firms may use to manage reported earnings. Graham et al. (2005) 
where DIS denotes discretionary expenses (the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses); TA and S denote total assets and total revenue. The residuals from Equation 4 represent abnormal discretionary expenses for firm i in year t. Firms are classified as a real activity manipulator when
(1) they have negative abnormal discretionary expenses (i.e., cutting discretionary expenses); (2) their reported earnings before extraordinary items exceed zero by no more than 4% of the end-ofyear market value of equity (i.e., exceed the zero earnings benchmark); and (3) the absolute level of 19 We thank the editor for the suggestion. Table 5 about Here]
In the above analysis, we excluded real activity manipulators from the definition of Normal firms to arrive at the modified Normal group, but did not add real activity manipulators to the definition of Suspect firms. As a further sensitivity test, we re-define Suspect firms to include those that meet not just the three criteria for discretionary accruals described in Section 3, but also the conditions for real activity manipulations. This more stringent definition of Suspect firms yields a much smaller pricing-error (valuation-error) sample, comprised of 76 (75) Suboptimal operating decisions lower firm value in the long run, but are of little concern to external auditors so long as manipulations are properly accounted for in the financial statements. Without a formal vetting process, real activity management is expected to be far more difficult for the capital market, including financial analysts, to detect than accrual management. 
Robustness Checks Based on an Alternative Constant Growth Assumption
When estimating terminal values, we have assumed a constant annual growth rate of 2%, which approximates the rate of inflation during our sample period. We now relax that assumption and use an alternative constant growth rate of 4%.
Univariate (multivariate) one-tailed tests of Hypotheses H1-H2 (H2) appear in Panel A (B)
of Table 6 about Here]
Summary
In short, the evidence presented in this section indicates that the RIM model can better estimate a firm's intrinsic value than the DCF model when accrual management is not a serious issue (H1).
However, the presence of accrual management is found to adversely affect the performance of RIM such that the accuracy advantage enjoyed by RIM over DCF narrows significantly from the level observed for Normal firms (H2). These results are invariant to alternative definitions of either Suspect or Normal firms, or both. They also remain qualitatively unchanged under an alternative constant growth rate of 4%.
Further Analyses
Sources of Accrual Management
In this section, we examine the question of which component(s) of the total accruals (i.e., specific accruals) would impair the RIM model's ability to outperform the DCF model. Results, appearing in Table 7 , indicate that the coefficient estimates on the SUSPECT variable, at -0.025 for the pricing-error sample (p = 0.051; Column 1) and -0.038 for the valuation-error sample (p = 0.027; Column 2), are very similar to those reported in Table 3 . Except for UAP, none of the coefficient estimates on the unexpected specific accruals are significantly different from zero, suggesting that none of the components are used systematically by Suspect firms to meet or beat earnings targets. 25 To ensure that our Table 3 results for H2 continue to hold for these much reduced samples, we re-run the regression based on Equation 3 and find that the coefficient estimates (un-tabulated) on the key test variable "SUSPECT" in the pricing-error and valuation-error samples are -0.024 and -0.036, significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
[Insert Table 7 Table 8 , Page 1109).
Large Earnings Manipulations
Throughout the paper, we have focused our attention on small earnings manipulations intended to avoid loss or earnings decline in the current reporting period. This research design is motivated by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) who report that small positive earnings changes occur more frequently than small negative earnings changes, pointing to the likely presence of earnings management to reach earnings targets. We have tried to overcome the concern that small earnings 27 Alternatively, we could have used a sample of firms that had restated their earnings or had been subject to enforcement actions by the SEC but both Callen et al. (2005) and Ettredge et al. (2010) find a very low number of such cases in relation to the population of US listed firms. Since Value Line analysts follow only 1,700 (mostly large) firms each year, the set of accounting restatements or AAER firms that fit the VL data requirements is likely to be very small. 28 These results extend to the pricing-error sample. For example, the coefficient estimate (p-value) on the SUSPECT variable is -0.030 (0.015).
[Insert Table 8 about Here]
Since firms whose values of discretionary accruals lie in the bottom 10% of the distribution may have also managed earnings by taking a big-bath in order to increase accounting reserves for future periods, it may be more appropriate to exclude these firms from the definition of the Normal group. Our results however remain qualitatively unchanged and hence are not tabulated to conserve space. 29 Findings that the estimation ability of RIM continues to suffer in a setting where the earnings management practice can be more readily detected by the market support our conjecture that Value Line analysts do not fully incorporate in their earnings forecasts the fact that the numbers are misrepresented.
Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the effect of accrual management on the performance of the earnings-based valuation models (e.g., RIM) relative to the non-earnings-based valuation models (e.g., DCF). Our aim is to show that findings from prior valuation literature that the RIM model generates more accurate intrinsic value estimates than DCF need not hold when one allows for variations in the quality of earnings in assessing the performance of these two classes of valuation models.
We use a research design that matches firms suspected of managing reported earnings through accrual manipulations to just avoid small losses or earnings declines in the current period with non-suspect (Normal) firms along the industry-year-size dimensions and employ analyst earnings or cash flows forecasts as proxies for market expectations. Results indicate that the RIM model can better estimate a firm's intrinsic value than the DCF model when accrual management is 29 At the univariate level, the difference in mean percentage valuation errors between DCF and RIM are 0.082 (0.054) for the Normal (Suspect) group. Moreover, the reduction in wedge across groups, at 0.027, is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient estimates on the SUSPECT variable are -0.017 (p = 0.118) and -0.026 (p = 0.04) for the pricingerror and the valuation-error samples, respectively. not a serious issue. The difference in mean absolute percentage estimation errors between these two models in this case is larger than that documented for the full sample in the prior valuation literature. We also find that the presence of accrual management adversely affects RIM's performance such that the accuracy advantage it enjoys over DCF narrows significantly from the level observed for Normal firms. These results are invariant to alternative definitions of either Suspect or Normal firms. They also remain qualitatively unchanged under an alternative constant growth rate of 4% and if we restrict our attention to large, rather than small, earnings manipulations.
An implication from our study is that users of valuation models (i.e., researchers, investors and practitioners) should not take managed earnings at face value and use them directly in firm valuation. In particular, heavy reliance on this number in firm valuation may result in inaccurate assessment, undesirable investment decisions and misallocation of resources in situations where earnings are managed. Compustat (1990 Compustat ( -2000 and forecast data from Value Line.
Industry groups are defined based on Fama and French (1993) .
In Panels A-C, current stock price refers to the main matched sample and ex-post intrinsic value refers to the matched sample for which all data is available to compute ex-post intrinsic values as in Subramanyam and Venkatachalam (2007) . COMPUSTAT (1990 COMPUSTAT ( -2000 and forecast data from Value Line.
In Panels A-B, current stock price is measured at the forecast date; ex post intrinsic value = the sum of future dividends over a three-year horizon and market price at the end of the horizon, discounted at the industry cost of equity, Market value is the current stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
In Panels A-C, BM is defined as book value per share over stock price per share, measured at fiscal year-end; ES is defined as the absolute value of changes in net income from Year t-1 to Year t, scaled by opening total assets; Std_ROE is measured over a 5-year period immediately preceding the annual report date; Cost of capital is computed from the CAPM with industry average Beta and 6% risk premium.
In Panel B, Suspect group refers to firms whose reported earnings before extraordinary items exceed zero by no more than 4% of the end-of-year market value of equity, who report positive discretionary accruals; and whose level of discretionary accruals is greater than the amount of reported earnings, but does not exceed 4% of the market value of equity. Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a non-suspect (Normal) firm.
In Panel C, DIFF is defined as the difference in absolute percentage estimation errors for each combination of firmyear observation and valuation model, i.e., (AE_DCF -AE_RIM). Terminal values are calculated using a 2% constant growth rate.
Summary statistics are based on the pricing-error sample. Results for the valuation-error sample are qualitatively similar and hence are not reported in a table to conserve space. ***, **,* t-tests on the difference in means across valuation models, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (one-sided). Sample: US firms with earnings announcements on COMPUSTAT (1990 COMPUSTAT ( -2000 and forecast data from Value Line.
In Panels A-B, current stock price is measured at the forecast date; ex post intrinsic value is future dividends over a three-year horizon plus market price at the end of the horizon, discounted at the industry cost of equity. Terminal value is calculated using a constant growth rate of 2%. P-values are for one-tailed tests when there are directional predictions.
In Panel A, absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation under RIM (or DCF) = the absolute value of the difference between estimated intrinsic value calculated according to Equation 1 (or Equation 2) and the chosen valuation benchmark (i.e., current stock price or ex post IV measure), scaled by the latter. For the loss avoidance threshold, firms are classified into the Suspect group if their reported earnings before extraordinary items exceed zero by no more than 4% of the end-of-year market value of equity, they report positive discretionary accruals and their level of discretionary accruals is greater than the amount of reported earnings, but does not exceed 4% of the market value of equity. The Suspect group for the earnings-decline avoidance threshold can be defined analogously, with discretionary accruals not exceeding 2% of market value. Firms are classified as normal if they are not in the Suspect group. Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a Normal firm; Match Diff. denotes the mean of differences in estimation errors between each Normal firm and its matched Suspect firm.
In Panel B, DIFF is defined as the difference in absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation and valuation model, i.e., (AE_DCF -AE_RIM), where terminal value is calculated using a 2% constant growth rate; SUSPECT is set equal to one if firms are suspected to have managed their reported earnings, and zero otherwise; BM is defined as book value per share over stock price per share, measured at fiscal yearend; ES is defined as the absolute value of changes in net income from Year t-1 to Year t, scaled by opening total assets; Std_ROE is measured over a 5-year period immediately preceding the annual report date. Sample: US firms with earnings announcements on COMPUSTAT (1990 COMPUSTAT ( -2000 and forecast data from Value Line.
In Panel A, absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation under RIM (or DCF) = the absolute value of the difference between estimated intrinsic value calculated according to Equation 1 (or Equation 2) and the chosen valuation benchmark (i.e., current stock price or ex post IV measure), scaled by the latter. Suspect group refers to firms whose increase in reported earnings before extraordinary items exceed zero by no more than 4% of the end-ofyear market value of equity, who report positive discretionary accruals and whose level of discretionary accruals is greater than the amount of increase in reported earnings, but does not exceed 2% of the market value of equity. Firms are classified as normal if they are not in the Suspect group. Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a Normal firm; Match Diff. denotes the mean of differences in estimation errors between each Normal firm and its matched Suspect firm.
In Panel A, absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation under RIM (or DCF) = the absolute value of the difference between estimated intrinsic value calculated according to Equation 1 (or Equation 2) and the chosen valuation benchmark (i.e., current stock price or ex post IV measure), scaled by the latter. The Suspect group includes both loss and earnings-decline avoiders, as defined in Table 3 . Firms are classified as normal if they are not in the Suspect group and do not meet the criteria for real activity manipulation (defined in a similar manner as Suspect group except that, in lieu of discretionary accruals, discretionary expenses are used in the definition). Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a Normal firm; Match Diff. denotes the mean of differences in estimation errors between each Normal firm and its matched Suspect firm.
In Panels A-B, current stock price is measured at the forecast date; ex post intrinsic value is future dividends over a three-year horizon plus market price at the end of the horizon, discounted at the industry cost of equity. Terminal value is calculated using a constant growth rate of 4%. P-values are for one-tailed tests when there are directional predictions.
In Panel A, absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation under RIM (or DCF) = the absolute value of the difference between estimated intrinsic value calculated according to Equation 1 (or Equation 2) and the chosen valuation benchmark (i.e., current stock price or ex post IV measure), scaled by the latter. The Suspect group includes both loss and earnings-decline avoiders, as defined in Table 3 . Firms are classified as normal if they are not in the Suspect group. Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a Normal firm; Match Diff. denotes the mean of differences in estimation errors between each Normal firm and its matched Suspect firm.
Current stock price is measured at the forecast date; ex post intrinsic value is future dividends over a three-year horizon plus market price at the end of the horizon, discounted at the industry cost of equity. Terminal value is calculated using a constant growth rate of 2%. UAR, UINV, UAP, UDEP, and USI denote, respectively, unexpected accounts receivable, unexpected inventory, unexpected accounts payable, unexpected depreciation expense, and unexpected special items, calculated based on Equations (5a) (5e). P-values are for one-tailed tests when there are directional predictions.
DIFF is defined as the difference in absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation and valuation model, i.e., (AE_DCF -AE_RIM), where terminal value is calculated using a 2% constant growth rate; SUSPECT is set equal to one if firms are suspected to have managed their reported earnings, and zero otherwise; BM is defined as book value per share over stock price per share, measured at fiscal yearend; ES is defined as the absolute value of changes in net income from Year t-1 to Year t, scaled by opening total assets; Std_ROE is measured over a 5-year period immediately preceding the annual report date. Sample: US firms with earnings announcements on COMPUSTAT (1990 COMPUSTAT ( -2000 and forecast data from Value Line.
In Panel A, absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation under RIM (or DCF) = the absolute value of the difference between estimated intrinsic value calculated according to Equation 1 (or Equation 2) and the chosen valuation benchmark (i.e., current stock price or ex post IV measure), scaled by the latter. Suspect group refers to firm-year observations with values of discretionary accruals in the top 10% of the distribution for the entire sample. The Normal group includes firm-year observations not classified as Suspect and not considered as part of the manipulators in our main analysis. Each Suspect firm is matched on industry, year and size with a Normal firm; Match Diff. denotes the mean of differences in estimation errors between each Normal firm and its matched Suspect firm.
In Panel B, DIFF is defined as the difference in absolute percentage estimation errors for each firm-year observation and valuation model, i.e., (AE_DCF -AE_RIM), where terminal value is calculated using a 2% constant growth rate; SUSPECT is set equal to one if firms are suspected to have managed their reported earnings, and zero otherwise; BM is defined as book value per share over stock price per share, measured at fiscal yearend; ES is defined as the absolute value of changes in net income from Year t-1 to Year t, scaled by opening total assets; Std_ROE is measured over a 5-year period immediately preceding the annual report date.
